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HISTORICAL SYNTHESIS 



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VOL. IX NO. I 



OCTOBER, 1903 



[Reprinted from The American Historical Review, Vol. IX., No. i, Oct., ic,03.] 



HISTORICAL SYNTHESIS 

SOIME forty years ago Thomas Buckle published the famous 
work in which he denounced the historical method then in 
use and attributed the failure of historians to raise history to the 
rank of the natural sciences to intellectual inferiority on their part. 
Of the zeal displayed in research and " of the immense value of 
that vast body of facts " that had been brought together Buckle 
had only words of praise. " But if, on the other hand," he went 
on, " we are to describe the use that has been made of these 
materials, we inust draw a very different picture. The unfortunate 
peculiarity of the history of man is, that although its separate parts 
have been examined with considerable ability, hardly any one has 
attempted to combine them into a whole and ascertain the way in 
which they are connected with each other. In all the other great 
fields of inquiry the necessity of generalization is universally 
admitted, and noble efforts are being made to rise from particular 
facts in order to discover the laws by which those facts are governed. 
So far, however, is this from being the usual course of historians, 
that among them a strange idea prevails, that their business is 
merely to relate events, which they may occasionally enliven by 
such moral and political reflections as seem likely to be useful."' 

Buckle believed that "the establishment of this narrow stan- 
dard " had led to results " very prejudicial to the progress of our 
knowledge." He acknowledged that "since the early part of the 
eighteenth century, a few great thinkers" had indeed arisen, who 
had deplored "the backwardness of history," and had done every- 
thing in their power to remedy it. i These instances had, however, 
been extremely rare, and it seemed desirable to him that something 

' Henry Thomas Buckle, Historv of Ciz>iIizafio>t in England (2 vols., New York, 
1870,1.3. 

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. IX. — I. I 



J3 1^ 



F, M. Mine 



cb 



should be done "on a scale far larger" than had hitherto been 
attempted, "and that a strenuous effort should be made to bring 
this great department of inquiry to a level with other departments, in 
order that we may maintain the balance and harmony of our knowl- 
edge." He hoped "to accomplish for the history of man some- 
thing equivalent, or at all events analogous," to what had been 
effected " by other inquirers for the different branches of natural 
science. In regard to nature, events apparently the most irregular 
and capricious have been explained and have been shown to be in 
accordance with certain fixed and universal laws. This has been 
done because men of ability, and above all, men of patient, untiring 
thought, have studied natural events with the view of discovering 
their regularity ; and if human events were subjected to a similar 
treatment, we have every right to expect similar results. . . . This 
expectation of discovering regularity in the midst of confusion is so 
familiar to scientific men, that among the most eminent of them it 
becomes an article of faith ; and if the expectation is not generally 
found among historians, it must be ascribed partly to their being of 
inferior ability to the investigators of nature, and partly to the 
greater complexity of those social phenomena with which their 
studies are concerned." He claimed that "the most celebrated 
historians are manifestly inferior to the most successful cultivators 
of physical science : no one having devoted himself to history who 
in point of intellect is at all to be compared with Kepler, Newton, 
or many others that might be named." He added, in a foot-note, 
that he spoke " merely of those that made history their main 
pursuit. Bacon wrote on it, but only as a subordinate object ; and 
it evidently cost him nothing like the thought which he devoted to 
other subjects." ^ 

The idea of raising history to the rank of a science by general- 
izing upon the social facts and by establishing laws did not originate 
with Buckle. He had been preceded by Comte, to whom he refers 
as " a living writer who has done more than any other to raise the 
standard of history." Comte, Buckle tells us, "contemptuously 
notices ' I'incoherente compilation de faits deja improprement quali- 
fiee d' histoirc' "-■ 

It is well known that the work of Buckle created a sensation. 
The discussion that it called forth has engaged the attention of a 
generation of scholars. To scientists the claim made by Buckle, 
that history could be made a science only by applying to social 
phenomena the method that had accomplished so much in investi- 



^3ul, I. 5. 
^/iid., I. 4. 



]-■ 



P. 



Historical Synthesis 3 

gating physical phenomena, appeared almost if not quite axiomatic ; 
to historians it was rank heresy. They not only denied that they 
had anything to do with historical laws, but asserted that such 
things could not be. The arguments made by the historians were 
not convincing. Droysen, in his defense of the historical method,' 
acknowledged that " our science has not yet set its theory and 
system on a firm footing." " The recognition will not be denied to 
historical studies," he said, " that even they have some part in the 
intellectual movement of our age, that they are active in discovering 
the new, in investigating anew what has been transmitted, and in 
presenting results in appropriate form. But when asked their scien- 
tific justification and their relation to the other circles of human 
knowledge, when asked what is the foundation of their procedure, 
what the connection of their means and their problems, they are, 
upto date, in no condition to give satisfactory information." 

These questions Droysen did not answer in a convincing manner. 
When he asked, " Is there, then, never more than one way, one 
method of knowledge ? Do not its methods incessantly vary accord- 
ing to their objects?", he was touching the root of the whole dis- 
cussion ; but he did not make clear what these methods are that 
give us respectively natural science or history. He claimed that 
the mind " apprehends spatial manifestations as nature and temporal 
occurrences as history ; not because they are so and so distinguished 
objectively, but in order to be able to grasp and think them " ; but 
he offered no satisfactory discussion of the logical difference between 
the synthesis of the natural sciences and of history. He even ren- 
dered the problem more complicated by treating history as a science 
of the moral world. 

The real point at issue — although not fully understood by either 
side in the debate — was a question of synthesis, of what form 
should be given to the facts that had been established as the result 
of the critical work. To improve the work of criticism, to lay down 
axioms for the establishment of the historical facts, would in no wise 
meet the objections of the natural scientist to the method — or the 
absence of method, as he considered it — of the historian. This 
was, however, exactly what Rhomberg hoped to do in his mono- 
graph entitled Die Erhebimg der Gesdiichte ztini Range cincr Wissoi- 
scJiaft? While the work was a valuable contribution to the litera- 

' The discussion of the subject by Droysen is found in the two articles entitled " The 
Elevation of History to the Rank of a Science" and "Nature and History," transla- 
tions of which are appended to the translation, by Dr. Andrews, of Droysen' s Gritudriss, 
under the title Outline of the Principles of History (Boston, 1893). 

2 Adolf Rhomberg, Die Erhebutig der Geschichte ztt/n Rattge einer Wissenschaft 
(Leipzig, 1883). Rhomberg chose for the motto of his book, " Erst die Gewissheit 



4 F. M. Fling 

ture of historical criticism, it had no influence, naturally, upon a dis- 
cussion that dealt with the question of historical synthesis. 

Although the natural scientists appeared to have the better of 
the argument — for logic offered no aid to the historian — men did 
not cease to write history in the old way. There seemed to be a 
feeling that even if the historical method could not be justified in 
the eyes of natural scientists, even if it were not scientific, it was 
doing something that needed to be done, and that could not be 
done by the use of the method of natural science. It was notice- 
able, however, that by the side of history was growing up a new 
s science, dealing also with the life of man in society, but employing 
the method of natural science and engaged in the search for regu- 
larity and law. This science had accepted the name employed by 
Comte\ and called itself sociology. It even claimed to be the 
science of history that Buckle had hoped to call into being. His- 
tory was simply a work of " erudition "■ ; the task of the historian 
was to prepare the material from which the laws of the sociologist 
were to be derived. The historian refused, however, to play the 
role of man-servant to the new science, and the discussion lived on 
although conducted with less vigor than in the days of Buckle. 

Some ten years ago, new life was breathed into the controversy 
by Professor Lamprecht of Leipzig. He announced the discovery 
of a new historical method the application of which would give a 

macht die Wissenschaft zur Macht." In his statement of the problem (p. 12) he said, 
" Was nun der Historiker gewiss zu machen hat, das ist eigentlich die Thatsdchlichkeit 
des gemeldeten Factums." Certainty concerning the facts of history would, he believed, 
raise history to the rank of a science. The same idea appears in Bernheim, Lehrbuch 
der historischen Methode (edition of 1894), 237. 

1 Paul Barth, Die Philosophie der Geschichle ah Sociologie (Leipzig, 1897), t^},, note. 

2P. Lacombe, De V Histoire Consideree cotnme Science (Paris, 1894), VII. 3. The 
attitude of the sociologist for a long time — and for the most of them even to-day — toward 
the historical method is well formulated by Lacombe: "Je rapelle en mon esprit la 
definition de la science, et je me dis : Si les homraes, dans leurs actes, dans leur con- 
duite, ont jamais presente quelque similitude, celle-ci pourra faire I'objet d'une proposi- 
tion g^nerale. L' histoire sera une science possible, dans la mesure oti ces similitudes 
s'offriront. Par contre, si I'humanite n'a aucune ressemblance avec elle-meme, si la con- 
duite de chacun des hommes qui ont passe a parfaitement difiere de la conduite des autres, 
I'histoire ne sera jamais une science." 

Louis Bordeau, L' Histoire et les Hist oriem (Paris, 1888), I: "L'histoire est toute 
^ refaire ou plutot elle n'est pas encore faite. Les fondements memes de la science sont a 
etablir. La construction attend son architecte. A peine peut-on dire que le passe nous 
a legu6 des materiaux. . . . [One of the conditions of a science is that] les connaissances 
acquises doivent pouvoir etre formulees en lois. . . . [History did not meet this require- 
ment] sa capacite d' etablir des lois, nulle." 

Paul Mougeolle, Les Probletnes de P Histoire (Paris, 1886), 40, in which he con- 
siders the problems of sociology, assumes that it is a question of either history or soci- 
ology : "On peut dire qu'aucun historien avant Montesquieu, sans en excepter Bodin 
lui-meme, n'a aperQu clairement I'idee de loi." 



Histor'ical Synthesis 5 

" new history." ^ It was simply the old question of historical syn- 
thesis, this time treated clearly as a question of synthesis. Stripped 
of all its local and temporal peculiarities, it was simply the old 
attempt to raise history to the rank of a science by applying to it 
the method of the natural sciences. The proof of this statement 
would seem to be found in the fact that in spite of his theories Lam- 
precht's history did not differ in form from that of the historians 
that had preceded him,^ and that if he had applied his theory he 
would have produced a sociology and not a history. It is not my 
purpose to add to the controversial literature that has been pro- 
duced in the discussion between Lamprecht and his opponents. I 
would simply call attention to the fact that Lamprecht asserts. that 
the old historical synthesis is unscientific and that there is but one 
scientific method of approach to any subject of investigation.^ It is 
the purpose of this article to raise a reasonable doubt upon the 
question that has been the whole matter at issue between the his- 
torians and the natural scientists during the last half-century. 

This question that has long divided the world of scholars is evi- 
dently, in the last analysis, a question of logic and of the theory of 
knowledge. It is the question asked by Droysen, but as yet un- 
answered : "Is there, then, never more than one way, one method 
of knowledge ? Do not its methods incessantly vary according to 
their objects ? " To this question the old logic gave no answer, or 
it assumed that there is but one kind of knowledge worth seeking 
and but one method. Logic was under the spell of the natural 
sciences. It had grown up under the influence of the natural 
sciences, it selected nearly all of its illustrations from them, and its 

1 Lamprecht's theory is formulated in Die kulturhistorische Methude (Berlin, 1900), 
and in an article entitled " Uber den Begriff der Geschichte und iiber historische und 
psychologisclie Gesetze," in ihe Annale?i der Nattirphi/osophie, Vol. II., No. 2. His- 
tory is "die Wissenschaft von den seelischen ^'eranderungen menschlicher Gemeiri- 
schaften " {Die kultitt historische Methode, 15). What is sociology? Science " ist 
nichts anderes als der Versuch, die Welt der Erscheinungen hoheren Begriffen und 
BegrilTssystemen zu unterstellen, als sie die Sprache schon darbietet " {Ibid., 6). Con- 
cepts with general or with individual contents ? Are these " systems " of concepts laws 
or complex wholes? Lamprecht's concepts are evidently concepts with general contents 
[Ibid., 25-29). Lamprecht's distinction between Geschichts^(:/;;Y//;««^ and Geschichts- 
wissenschaft is evidently the same thing as history and sociology {Ibid., 35). 

2 " Meine Deutsche Geschichte ist das erste historische Werk, das nach den Begriffen 
soldier Kulturzeitalter disponiert ist und damit die Entwicklung des deutschen Volkes 
nach den Forderungen der kulturhistorischen Methode darstellt " {Ibid., 26). That 
there is any logical difference between the method employed in writing the volume of this 
history devoted to the German Reformation and the method employed by Ranke in deal- 
ing with the same subject is not clear to the uninitiated. 

''In both the articles referred to above he traces the history of the development ot 
the sciences and endeavors to make clear why historical science has not kept pace in its 
development with the natural sciences. 



(/■ 



6 F. M, Fling 

general theories were constructed upon a natural-science basis. ^ It 
had not, for the most part, occurred to the modern logician that 
there could be any other point of view. When the natural scientist 
asserted that the method of the historian was illogical, he was 
speaking by the book ; logic bore him out. If, now, logic should 
free itself, should discover that the method is determined by the end ; 
that there is no one method that can give us the whole truth ; 
that there are some things that we want to know, that we have a 
right to know, and that cannot be discovered by the method of 
natural science, then historical science would come at last to a con- 
sciousness of its method and would be able to justify its procedure. 
While Lamprecht was congratulating himself that the new school 
of historians had driven the old school from the field or had left to 
them the pursuit of something that could not logically be called a 
science,^ this long domination of the natural-science method in logic 
was coming to an end and the foundation upon which he had built 
up his theories was being undermined. As early as 1888, in his 
study Ziir Lclirc von dcr Definition, Rickert had attacked the idea 
of a universal natural-science method and had sought to show " how 
meaningless the theory is in accordance with which the common 
elements of things are identical with the essential characteristics of 
their concepts." " It had become clear to me," he wrote later, 
" that there is always need of a definite object by means of which 
the essential characteristics may be separated from the unessential ; 
and that, in theories of methods, the important thing is to become 
acquainted with these various objects in order to understand and do 
justice to the manifoldness of scientific methods." ^ In the same 
year appeared the treatise by Naville entitled Dc la Classification dcs 
Sciences, in which he arranged the sciences in three groups : the 
first, entitled " histoire," comprised the sciences of the reality; the 
second, or " theorematique," dealing with what might be called the 
natural sciences, he characterized as " the sciences of the necessary 

'Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (Strassburg, 1900, zweite 
Auflage), 13, 14. 

2 " Die Geschichtsic/^r^?^?/;?^'- bleibt nach wie vor ein kiinstlerisches Geschaft, denn 
sie wirkt auf die Anschauung und beschaftigt sich gewohnlich mit dem was an den ge- 
schichtlichen Vorgangen als singular erscheint " i^Die kultia-historische Methode, 35). It 
is clear from Professor Dow' s article on " Features of the new History ' ' (American His- 
torical Review, April, 1898), in which he makes a synthesis of Lamprecht's ideas as 
found in his different pamphlets, that the "old method," largely outgrown, is being 
rapidly replaced by the " new method," based upon psychology and seeking for the 
"typical stages" in social development. "Whatever the rational has not yet con- 
quered " is left to those " who see at the basis the singular, not the regular." 

3 Heinrich Rickert, Zur Lehrc von der Definition (Freiburg i. B., 1888). The quo- 
tation is from the Vorivort to Die Gremen der nahirivissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. 



Historical Synthesis 7 

conditions of the possible, or the sciences of law." ^ Siminel in 
1892 declared that " In so far as it is the affair of historical science 
to describe what has actually occurred, in that it is above all things 
the science of reality, it stands in the sharpest imaginable contrast 
to all sciences of law." ^ Finally in 1894 Windelband,M-ejecting 
the common division of the sciences into NatiirzvissoiscJiaftcn and 
Gcistcsivisscnschaften, and adopting as the principle of division the 
end aimed at, proposed the classification sciences of /^zc and sciences 
of events, or in other words, natural science and history. Two 
years later Rickert published the first part of his work Die Grenaen 
der natiirivissenscJiaftlicJicn Begriffsbildung.^ It was the negative 
portion of his treatise, and I shall deal with it in connection with 
the positive treatment of the theory that appeared in 1902. 

All of these conceptions of the relation of natural science to 
historical science had much in common, and testified to a coming 
change in the conception of the logic of the sciences. The litera- 
ture of the discussion was enriched in 1899 by two important con- 
tributions, one by a psychologist, Miinsterberg,^ the other by an 

1 Rickert, Die inaiiit^ficiissensckaftliche Bcgriffsbildimg, 299. Naville's monograph is 
out of print and I have been unable to obtain a copy of it. In 1901 M. Naville reprinted 
his work under the title NouvcUe Classification des Sciences. He there defines history 
as the " science desrealites diverses dans I'espace et changeantes dans le temps" (Berr 
in Revue de Synthese Historique, June, 1902, 294). Berr notes " une tendance crois- 
sante a faire d' une definition de I'histoire la base de la classification des sciences" {Ibid.). 

^Georg Simmel, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie (Leipzig, 1892), 43. 

■'Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte und N^aturwisscnschaft, 16-19. 

*The first three chapters of the work appeared in 1896, the last two in 1902. The 
chapters and their subdivisions are as follows : I. Die begriffliche Erkenntniss der 
Korperwelt. ( l ) Die Mannigfaltigkeit der Korperwelt und ihre Vereinfachung durch 
die allgemeine Wortbedeutung. (2) Die Bestimmtheit des Begriffes. (3) Die Geltung 
des Begriffes. (4) Dingbegriffe und Relationsbegriffe. (5) Die mechanische Natur- 
auffassung. (6) Beschreibung und Erklarung. II. Natur und Geist. (l) Physisch 
und Psychisch. (2) Die begriffliche Erkenntnis des Seelenlebens. (3) Naturwissen- 
schait und Geisteswissenschaft. III. Natur und Geschichte. (i) Die naturwissen- 
schaftliche Begriffsbildung und die empirische Wirklichkeit. (2) Der Begriff des His- 
torischen. (3) Die historischen Bestandtheile in den Naturwissenschaften. (4) Natur- 
wissenschaft und Geschichtswissenschaft. IV. Die historische Begriffsbildung. ( i ) 
Das Problem der historischen Begriffsbildung. (2) Das historische Individuum. (3) 
Die teleologische Begriffsbildung. (4) Der historische Zusammenhang. (5) Die ge- 
schichtliche Entwicklung. (6) Die naturwissenschaftlichen Bestandtheile in den his- 
torischen Wissenschaften. (7) Geschichtswissenschaft und Geisteswissenschaft. (8) 
Die historischen Kulturwissenschaften. V. Naturphilosophie und Geschichtsphilo- 
sophie. (l) Die naturalistische Geschichtsphilosophie. (2) Die empirische Objek- 
tivitat. (3) Die metaphysische Objektivitat. (4) Der erkenntnisstheoretische Subjek- 
tivismus. (5) Die kritische Objektivitat. (6) Naturwissenschaftliche und historische 
Weltanschauung. 

5 Miinsterberg's paper was read before the American Philosophical Society, and 
appeared in the Psychological Review (January, 1S99). The title was " History and Psy- 
chology." It was reprinted in 1899 as chapter five, or as the fifth paper, in Psychology 
and Life. 



F. M. Flmp 



<5> 



historian, Xenopol.^ Miinsterberg, wishing to free ps)'chology from 
the danger of a too intimate association with histor}-, attempted a 
new classification of the sciences that he might assign to each its own 
province. While he declared himself in sympathy with the effort 
of German logicians to separate psychology from history, and 
looked upon such " logical separation as a liberating deed," he con- 
sidered the arguments that had led to this separation " mistaken 
and untenable in every respect." He asserted that the difference 
between psychology and history is " not in the kind of treatment, but 
in the material itself", psychology dealing with objects, history with 
subjective will-attitudes. He formed four groups of sciences cor- 
responding to four groups of facts in reality : 

We have the science of the over-individual objects, that is, physics ; 
secondly, the science of the individual objects, that is, psychology ; 
thirdly, the sciences of the over-individual will-acts, that is, the norma- 
tive sciences ; and last, and not least, the sciences of the individual will- 
acts, that is, the historical sciences. Physics and psychology have thus 
to do with objects ; history and the normative systems, ethics, logic, 
esthetics, deal with will-acts. Physics and history have thus absolutely 
different material ; the one can never deal with the substance of the 
other, and thus they are separated by a chasm, but their method is the 
same. Both connect their material ; both consider the single experience 
under the point of view of the totality, working from the special facts 
towards the general facts, from the experience toward the system. 

Elsewhere in the same article Miinsterberg states that history as 
distinguished from psychology has nothing to do with causal con- 
nections : 

The manifoldness of will-acts, the totality of which forms my real 
personality, thus refers in every act to the will-acts and attitudes of other 
subjects which I acknowledge or oppose, imitate or overcome. These 
demands and suggestions of others are not in question in my life as 
causes or partial causes of my will ; they have not to be sought in the 
interest of a causal connection ; they are merely conditions which I as 
subject of attitude and acts presuppose for my free decision, and which 
are logically contained in it ; the connection is, therefore, not a causal, 
but merely a teleological one. The endless world of will-acts which 
stands thus in teleologically determining relation to our will-attitudes 
forms the only material of history. 

As the practice of the historian does not agree with the logic of 
the method as Miinsterberg has formulated it, he criticizes the 
practice : 

A history which interprets subjectively and understands their pur- 
poses out of the deeds of men relinquishes, indeed, its only aim if it 
coordinates these teleological relations with the causal explanation of 
human happenings from climatic and geographical, technical and eco- 
nomical, physiological and pathological influences. The subject which 
is determined by purposes is free ; the action which is the effect of causes 
is unfree. 

1 A. D. Xenopol, Lcs Prmcipes Fondamentatix de F Histoire (Paris, 1S99). 



Historical Synthesis 9 

When Munsterberg wrote this paper the second part of Rickert's 
work had not appeared and a clear understanding of Rickert's logic 
of the historical method was not possible. 1 shall refer to Miinster- 
berg's theory again in presenting the outline of Rickert's logic. 

The point of view of Xenopol in Lcs Principcs Fondamentanx dc 
V Histoirc is closer to that of the first group of writers and agrees, 
for the most part, with the teachings of Rickert. All phenomena 
he divided into two classes, coexistent facts, afterwards called re- 
peated facts, and successive facts} The natural sciences deal with 
the former, the historical sciences with the latter. In a review of 
Rickert's volume in 1902 Xenopol formulated the substance of his 
theory of the historical method : 

History deals only with phenomena individualized by time, that is 
to say, those that are produced but once in the course of the ages ; such 
a conception could not furnish opportunity for the formation of notions 
of law, but only for that of unique and particular series ; causality can 
only assume (in history) the same serial form and not that of repetition 
under the form of laws independent of time ; this conception applies as 
well to the history of the human mind as to that of the earth and organ- 
isms ; it is not in applying to history the method of the natural sciences 
that this discipline will be raised to the rank of a science, but it is neces- 
sary, on the contrary, to complete the logic of repetition by that of suc- 
cession.' 

Xenopol's work was valuable and interesting, but his formula- 
tion of the logic of historical method was not sufficiently definite. 
Are all successive facts historical facts ? If not, by what means do 
we distinguish the essential, or historical successive facts, from the 
unessential ? Xenopol did not answer that question.^ More than 
that, two kinds of phenomena certainly do not exist. Repeated 
facts and successive facts are simply two points of view, all the facts 
of reality being unique and unrepeated. Failing to see that succes- 
sive facts might also be repeated facts, if the unique in several series 
be eliminated, leaving only what is common in the succession, he 
denied the possibility of formulating sociological laws. 

•Rickert's complete treatise, containing both the negative portion 
of the theory that had appeared in 1896 and the new positive por- 
tion, was published in 1902. It was the first detailed attempt to 
formulate the logic of the historical method. Whatever may be the 
final judgment of logicians upon his theory, it is a serious piece of 

1 In the first chapter, " Les Phenomenes Coexistants et les I'henomenes Successifs," 
Xenopol presents his theory of the classification of the sciences. His most important 
contribution to the theory of historical synthesis is in chapters ten and eleven, where he 
deals with the historical series and causal connection. 

''^ Revue de SyntJi^se Historique (June, 1902), 292. 

''See Rickert's criticism of this point in Die Gi cnzeii der naturwisenschaflUchen 
Begrijfsbildmii;, 450. 



lo F. M. Fling • 

work and must be taken seriously.^ It is not the outcome of the 
Lamprecht discussion, the theory having been conceived and partly 
formulated before any such discussion existed. It is likely to trans- 
form the old logic and, supplying a scientific basis for the methods 
of history and of natural science, put an end to a discussion that has 
lasted long and has been largely due to a mutual misunderstanding. 
There would seem, then, to be sufficient reasons for calling the at- 
tention of historians to the outlines of Rickert's logic of the histor- 
ical sciences. 

The attempt to formulate the logic of the historical sciences was 
the natural result of the conclusion reached by Rickert in 1888, that 
the object of a science determined what its method should be." 
Unable to see how there could be a universal method, he naturally 
rejected the claims of universal applicability made for the method of 
the natural sciences. Instead of proceeding directly to formulate the 
logic of the historical sciences, he decided to clear the ground by de- 
termining the limits of the application of the natural-science method, 
or in his language, the limits to the formation of n'atural-science con- 
cepts. What the method of the natural science could not do must 
be done, clearly, by some other method. The problem was not one 
of research, but of the formulation of the results of research.^ 

1 Lamprecht [Die kultur/iistorisc/ie Methode, 24), while discussing the logic of the 
historical method, makes the following reference to Rickert's scholarly work : " Freilich 
kann man der Ideenlehre noch von einer anderen Seite zu Hilfe kommen. Man kann 
dogmatisch erklaren, die singulare Seite der Vorgange sei in der Geschichte unter alien 
Umstanden die wesentliche ; da ihr Erfassen nur auf dem Wege der Idee erfolgen konne 
und die Ideen die Annahme einer historischen Kausalitat ausschlossen, so sei eben die 
gewohnliche herkommliche Logik, welche auf dem Kausalitatsgesetze beruht, fiir die 
Geschichte nicht anwendbar, und es miisse deshalb deren Giiltigkeit bestritten und eine 
neue, der Geschichte in Singularauffassung und damit alien Geisteswissenschaften genii- 
gende Logik erst erfunden werden. Diesen Ausweg hat neuerdings ein Philosoph in der 
That vorgeschlagen ; er braucht wohl nicht erst kritisiert zu werden." Certainly even if 
ttie book " does not deserve to be criticized," it deserves to be read carefully enough so 
that its contents may be correctly stated ! 

^ In his monograph Zitr Lehre von der Definition, 28, 29, Rickert expressed him- 
self as follows: " Jede Wissenschaft hat vielmehr ihre eigene Methode, die sie sich 
selbst schafft, und die ihren Zielen und Absichten angemessen sein muss. Und wie wir das 
menschliche Denken nur aus dem Zwecke heraus verstehen konnen, dasses die Wahrheit 
finden will, so werden wir auch die Methoden der einzelnen Wissenschaften nur aus ihren 
speciellen Zwecken heraus begreifen. Wir miissen daher, um zu verstehen, was wesent- 
liche und unwesentliche Merkmale sind, einzelne Wissenschaften gesondert betrachten. 
Fiir eine Universalmethode wiirde allerdings alles in der Welt gleich wesentlich sein. 
Fiir die Methode einer Sonderwissenschaft, die sich eine beschrankte Aufgabe stellt, 
kommt nur ein Theil des W'eltganzen in Betracht, und die Unterscheidung des Wesent- 
lichen und Unwesentlichen ist gar nicht zu umgehen. Ein Kriterium fiir die Unter- 
scheidung konnen wir natiirlich wieder nur aus der Aufgabe gewinnen, welche eine 
Wissenschaft stellt." See also ibid., 39. 

3 The fact that it is a problem of the Aitffassung, or synthesis, with which we have to 
do, of the way in which the facts are put together, and not criticism, the way in which 



Historical SynitJiesis 1 1 

What, then, is the end of the natural sciences, or what is the 
task of the natural-science concept, and how is this end attained ? 
The world of reality is manifold, endless in extent, and infinite in 
variety. To enable a finite mind to comprehend this reality some 
v_^iethod of simplification is indispensable. The task of the natural- 
science concept is found in this attempt to overcome the extensive 
and intensive manifoldness of things for the purpose of attaining a 
scientific knowledge of the reality. The means for the accomplish- 
ment of this task are found already existent in the language of 
every day. The employment of terms, or concepts, to indicate 
what is common to a number of objects is a process of simplification ■ 
and the beginning of the natural-science method. But in the com- 
mon language these general terms are inexact and need to be 
modified somewhat before they can serve a scientific end ; they 
must be not only general, but definite and universally valid. Their 
indefiniteness is due to the difficulty of separating general terms from 
special associations ; this is overcome by definition and by the sub- 
stitution of concepts of relations for concepts of things, indefiniteness 
being largely associated with concepts of things from which it is 
practically impossible to eliminate all traces of the perceptible re- 
ality. In pursuit of its ideal the natural-science method, striving 
to become ever more exact, transforms the concepts of things ever 
more into concepts of relations, until in the most highly developed 
form of natural science the thing has become a final thing, an atom. 
In mechanics we have the natural-science conception of corporeal 
nature. " Natural science teaches that the reality that presents itself 
to us as so endlessly manifold is at bottom always and everywhere 
the same. All variety and all change rest upon the movement of 
an unchangeable elementary substratum in space." ' Just as me- 
chanics works with final, imperceptible things called atoms and 
with a law of motion, so psychology for the world of mind deals 
with simple sensations — things that do not exist in reality — and 
the law of association. But the attainment of the ideal of the natural 
sciences does not depend alone upon the elimination of the per- 
ceptible from the concept, and the transformation of concepts of 
things into concepts of relations ; it depends also upon the assump- 
tion that what is found to be true for a part of the reality is true for 
the whole of reality, in other words, that the concepts of natural 
science are universally valid. 

we determine what the facts are, is an indication that the historian is progressing in the 
consciousness of his method. Heuiistik and criticism do not enter into the discussion. 
So much has been won. This discussion will leave us with a clearer idea of what 
synthesis is. 

1 Rickert, Die Grcnzen der iiatio-unssctischafilichen Begriffibildmii^, ICO. 



12 F. M. Flino 



«3 



The logical sense of the term nature, then, in the expression 
natural science, is not the reality per sc, but the reality interpreted, 
looked at from the point of view of the general or universal. The 
more successful the method is in formulating general concepts, or 
laws, and in combining these laws into systems, the nearer it ap- 
proaches to its ideal, but, at the same time, the less this system contains 
of the perceptible reality. In the interest of exactness, the natural- 
science method endeavors to eliminate this disturbing element as 
much as possible from its concepts, but into many of the natural 
sciences there enters a large historical element that interferes with 
the attainment of the ideal. In mechanics it is entirely absent, but 
it appears in physics, and increases as we pass through chemistry 
and biology to sociology. The physicist assumes the existence of 
light, heat, and sound, but it might well be asked, when and where 
did light first appear ? Naturally this is a problem that, on account 
of lack of evidence, will never be solved, but the historical question 
of the origin of the chemical elements is one that can be treated 
and has already been treated. The presence of the historical ele- 
ment in the material that the natural scientist deals with does not 
modify the point of view in his work nor the application of the 
method. Whether it be the reality of social life, of organic life, of 
chemistry, or of physics, he always regards it from the point of view 
of the general ; and his generalizations are valid for the portion of 
the reality with which he deals. As he passes from a narrower to 
a broader field, his laws are valid for more and more of the reality, 
but what they gain in comprehensiveness they lose in content. Al- 
though the laws or concepts of natural science assume the exis- 
tence of the reality for which they are valid, the ynique reality en- 
ters into its system only by way of example; and natural science, 
which aims to comprehend the reality under the point of view of the 
general, has no interest in the unique reality as such. No single 
event and no single series can be inferred from natural-science con- 
cepts that take cognizance only of the general. " We know that a 
certain seed brought to a certain place is fruitl„ ; and we know that 
there are birds and insects that carry it ; but that to exactly this 
place a bird or insect will bring this seed no natural scientist can 
foresee." ^ As natural science cannot foresee a unique event, no 
more can it tell us of the unique past. " Law has an ideal char- 
acter, no bridge leads from it to the tangible reality."^ As long as 

1 Richard M. Meyer, " Uber die Moglichkeit historischer Gesetze," in Historische 
Vie7-teljahrschrift (April 14, 1903), 165. All tliat Meyer writes about the possibility 
of historical laws would be admitted as applying to sociological laws. 

^ Simmel, Die Prohleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, 42. 



I 



Historical Synthesis 



its aim is to simplify the reality in order to comprehend it ; as long 
as it works with what is common to a number of objects and not 
with what is unique ; as long as it is forced to eliminate the perceptible 
in the interest of exactness, since the reality is unique and perceptible, 
it is evident that the nearer the natural-science method is to its ideal, 
the farther it is from the perceptible reality. The limit, then, to the 
formation of natural-science concepts is the unique and perceptible 
reality itself. If we desire to become acquainted with the unique 
and perceptible reality, we must use some other method than that 
of the natural sciences. That method is the method of the his- 
torical sciences. 

The entire empirical reality (psychical as well as corporeal) can be 
regarded from a point of view entirely different from that of nature. It 
becomes nature when we consider it from the point of view of the general ; 
it becomes history when we regard it from the side of the particular. 
Every empirical science must set out from the directly experienced reality. 
The most general distinction in methods is to be sought in what the dif- 
ferent sciences undertake to do with this reality, that is, it depends on 
whether they seek the general and the unreal (meaning that which cannot 
be perceived) in the form of a concept (or law), or the reality (the per- 
ceptible) in the special and individual. To natural science falls the one 
task, to historical science the other. ^ 

The reality is unique. Nothing repeats itself and no two things 
are exactly alike. It is with this unique reality that historical 
science has to do. It cannot comprehend its endless and infinite 
manifoldness any more than the natural sciences were able to do, 
but it can comprehend a portion of the reality that could not be 
comprehended by the other method ; it can present something of 
the uniqueness of the reality and at the same time retain something 
of its perceptibility. It must simplify in order to comprehend, but 
it must simplify in a different manner from the natural sciences. It 
finds a starting-point in life just as the natural-science method did. 
Besides the common names, in the vulgar speech, it encounters 
proper names, terms applied to unique individuals ; it is a beginning 
of simplification. Not all unique things can enter into the historical 
sciences. How shall the essential be distinguished from the unes- 
sential ? It is the problem of the formation of the historical concept. 

But concept suggests generalization, generalization suggests law, 
and the seeming impossibility of any other method than that of the 
natural sciences confronts us at the very beginning of the investi- 
gation. The difficulty is not so serious as it seems. We cannot 
think, it is true, without the use of general terms (such as man, 
king, war, peace), and these terms must be combined to form con- 
cepts, but not all concepts are concepts with general contents ; gen- 

' Rickert, Die G)-enzen der naturtvissenschafiljcken Begriffsbihhmg , 255. 



14 F. M. Flmg 

eral terms may be so combined as to give a concept with a unique, 
individual content. "Some men possess military genius" and 
" Napoleon possessed military genius " are both concepts, both con- 
tain general terms, but the introduction of the proper noun into the 
last sentence makes out of it a concept with an individual content, 
stating what was true of but one man in all the past. There have 
been many military geniuses, but there has been but one Napoleon 
who was a military genius. Concepts without proper names may, 
also, have individual contents. 

It is not, however, yet clear what the bond is that binds the ele- 
ments of the historical concept together. It cannot be simply the 
unique and individual that leads us to select one fact rather than 
another for our historical synthesis, for all facts and all things are 
individual, a piece of coal being as individual and unique as a Kohi- 
noor diamond. Its uniqueness must be bound up with its indivisi- 
bility or unity. The unity of a piece of coal matters little, that of 
the Kohinoor diamond everything. It loses its uniqueness with 
its unity. The same is true of a piece of canvas and a head by 
Titian, a piece of clay and a Sevres vase. The unity of the object, 
then, has value for us. We have to do here with a question of 
value, with a standard. Every object in the reality is complex and 
may attract the attention of the scientist either because of charac- 
teristics that it has in common with other objects or because of its 
unique traits. If the value of an object is due to what is unique in 
it, it certainly cannot enter into a general concept. Moreover, in 
describing it the scientist may note only those characteristics upon 
which its uniqueness and consequently its unity rest. 

We thus reach the method of simplification applied by the his- 
torian : he chooses from the endless number of individuals those 
that are valuable because they are unique, whose uniqueness is in- 
separable from their unity, and that thus have an importance be- 
cause their loss or destruction would be irreparable. Our interest 
in an iron band is not historical ; our interest in the iron crown of 
Lombardy is. To overcome the infinite manifoldness of the individual 
object the historian selects only those features of the object that are 
distinctive of it, that mark its unity and render it valuable. 

The use of the word value seems to introduce an uncertain and 
arbitrary element into the problem. Valuable for whom ? How 
can there be any agreement among historians touching what unique 
facts shall be chosen ? Will the history of the Reformation writ- 
ten by a Catholic resemble that written by a Protestant ? Will the 
opponents of the French Revolution select the same facts for their 
synthesis as have been selected by the supporters of it ? Undoubt- 



Historical Synthesis 1 5 

edly, if they proceed scientifically. The question of value is not a 
question of partizanship nor of approval or disapproval ; it is a ques- 
tion of importance. Is this fact important for the history of the 
Reformation ? Is an account of the Reformation intelligible with- 
out it ? The Protestant may love Luther, the Catholic may hate him, 
but they would agree that Luther is important for the history of the 
Reformation. This question of values is not decided by popular 
vote, by the man upon the street, any more than the laws of nat- 
ural science are settled by careless, unscientific inference. They are 
the result of careful study and persistent discussion among scientists. 
The progress in historical synthesis means a growing agreement 
among scientific historians touching the important facts of this or 
that period. The historical method is thus teleological in a certain 
sense. The subject of an historical investigation is a unique thing, 
the life of an historical personage, a battle, an economic crisis, a 
period in the life of a people. It forms a unit and its value depends 
on its unity. It has beginning and end. We know what the end 
was, and we wish to know what the chain of events was that led up 
to the final event. We seek such facts, to be wrought up into a' 
synthesis, as may be necessary to show how the end was attained. 
The unique individuals with which the historian works are not 
necessarily persons nor are they single events ; they may be the life 
of a people, the evolution of European society, the evolution of 
world society, the evolution of the visible universe. Moreover, 
these individuals are not isolated facts. Only art treats isolated 
individuals, and history is not art.' It deals with a related body of 
truth ; and each of its unique individuals, each of its units, is part 
of a larger individual or unit and can be understood only when 
treated in relation to a larger whole. The Protestant Reformation 
is intelligible only when treated as a part of that larger whole that 
embraces the entire reform movement in the Latin church in the 
fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries ; again, the history of 
the Reformation as a whole must be treated as a part of the whole 
history of the church, embracing the Eastern and Western churches, 
or it may be looked upon as a part of the historical life of Europe. 
The smaller unit is always related to a larger one until the limits of 
the visible universe are reached, for history deals with the whole of 
reality. This is the common practice of trained historians to-day, 
and yet they have been charged with dealing with isolated facts. 
Miinsterberg confounded the formation of larger and larger general- 
izations, after the manner of natural science, with this grouping of 

'Jonas Cohn, Allgemeine Asthetik (Leipzig, 1901), 35, 36; Miinsterberg, Psy- 
chology and Life, chapter entitled "Psychology and Art," 145-17S. 



1 6 F. M. Flmg 

unique facts into larger and larger wholes. The difference is an 
(important one and is the second point of difference between the two 
methods. In the selection of the elements for its synthesis, natural 
science chooses what is common to a number of facts ; historical 
method selects what is important for the whole. What Luther has 
in common with other Germans might be important for the sociol- 
ogist ; it would not be for historians. It was just the thing that 
was unique in Luther, that distinguished him from other Germans, 
that rendered him important for the Reformation and for the whole 
subsequent life of Germany, that makes him an historical character. V 
' In the second place, the synthesis of natural science differs from that 
of historical science in that the former treats the individual fact as 
an example under a law, while the latter treats it as a complex part 
of a complex whole. In natural science, the more comprehensive 
the generalization, the thinner its content ; in historical science, the 
larger the concept, so much the richer it is. The whole Reforma- 
tion is more complex and richer in content than any of the parts 
of the Reformation in Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain, or the 
Netherlands, because it embraces them all. * Furthermore, it should 
not be forgotten that while the whole is more complex and richer 
in content than any of its parts, the part retains its individuality and 
does not simply appear as the illustration of a law. If Buckle could 
discover no logical synthesis in the works of such a man as Ranke, 
it was because he was blind to every form of synthesis but that of 
natural science. When Miinsterberg asserts that " Every science 
considers the single facts in their relations to other facts, works 
toward connections," he is simply stating what has always been the 
practice of historians ; but when he adds "towards generalities," he 
is stating what is not the practice and what could not be the practice 
if history is to remain history. His failure to note that the relation 
of the fact to other facts is not necessarily that of an example under 
a law, of a less abstract thing to a more abstract, but may be that 
of a complex part to a complex whole, leads him to the illogical 
conclusion that the method of natural science does not differ from 
that of historical science. 

Not only does historical science select the facts important for 
the whole, instead of those common to all ; not only does it treat 
these units as parts of a complex whole instead of examples under 
a law ; but it traces the causal connection between the facts. How 
can it trace causal connection without discovering laws and thus 
applying the method of the natural science ? The confusion here 
is due to another misunderstanding as fundamental as those touch- 
ing the selecting and grouping of the facts. Causality as a principle, 



Historical Synthesis 1 7 

namely, that there is no effect produced in the empirical reality 
without a cause, has been treated as synonymous with natural law, 
that is, that the cause is equal to the effect. From one point of 
view, the cause is always equal to the effect ; it is the point of view 
of natural science and is true only when we have eliminated what is 
unique from the series. From another point of view, the cause is 
never equal to the effect ; it is the point of view of historical science. 
In the first case we speak of causal law ; in the second, of causal 
connection. The points of view are complementary. I describe 
the battle of Waterloo and trace the causal connection up to the 
great disaster; I may find small causes producing big effects; it is 
the truth from one point of view. It cannot be denied that the 
natural-science method may be applied to the study of the material 
from which I constructed my historical synthesis, and may produce 
something quite different. Neither synthesis is false. The points 
of view are different ; that is all. Because paper may be used for 
writing a letter does not debar us, on an occasion, from using it to 
light a fire. 

The logic of the historical concept is not yet complete. History 
deals with the reality, and the reality is ever in motion. Our concept 
must be enriched by the idea of evolution. The expression has 
many meanings ; it is necessary to fix upon one of them as con- 
taining the historical idea. Historical evolution means not simply 
motion, nor change, but a change that is unique and is important on 
account of its uniqueness. Motion and change, being conmion to 
all reality, cannot be the forms of evolution that we are seeking for. 
Natural science may treat of changes that are repeated and may 
formulate the laws of change. Sociology, dealing with social data 
from the point of view of the general, may trace the general process 
of social evolution, deriving its generalizations from several series 
of social changes. But a change that is historical must not only 
be unique, one that has never appeared before and can never appear 
again in our world, but it must be important on account of its new- 
ness. The evolutionary series that the historian constructs is teleo- 
logical ; it has a well-defined beginning and end, and passes through 
certain definite stages ; each stage is important per sc, and the indi- 
vidual facts are important because they contributed to a certain 
result. 

There are two peculiarities of the absolute historical concept 
that still remain to be noticed. The natural-science concept is 
rendered definite by eliminating, as much as possible through defi- 
nition, the perceptible that clings to the concept. The historical 
method, whose aim it is to keep as close as possible to the percep- 

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. IX. — 2. 



1 8 F. M. Fling 

tible reality, cannot employ this method. It renders its concept 
definite by producing a clear image of the person or event that it is 
treating. It often uses for this purpose more material than appears 
to be logically necessary. The historian, to make definite the con- 
cept of Luther, of Napoleon, or of Bismarck, of the Diet of Worms, 
the retreat from Moscow, or the crowning of the Prussian king at 
Versailles, uses such material as may be necessary in his judgment 
to render perceptible the uniqueness of the person or the event. It 
is this end in view that justifies the description of personal traits,' 
the reproduction of characteristic sayings, and of photographs of 
persons and places. The second peculiarity is encountered in the 
treatment of causal connection. 

Every actual evolutionary series forms a continuous whole, but if it 
is divided into definite, teleologically essential stages, the gradual transi- 
tion from stage to stage is destroyed. A science of the reality cannot 
permit such gaps to exist, but must fill them out with causal beginnings, 
that the various stages may be at the same time teleologically distinct 
and causally connected with one another. Everywhere where this is 
necessary, constituent parts of the reality become essential that are not 
teleologically necessary.' 

This accounts for the appearance of secondary persons and 
events. In the interest of causal connection the writer of an his- 
torical biography may and does introduce secondary individuals and 
events, simply in the interest of causal connection or explanation. 

The form of the absolute historical concept is now complete. 
In forming his concept the historian employs general terms, but he 
combines them to form a concept with an individual content ; the 
natural scientist forms concepts with general contents. The his- 
torian selects unique objects, important for the whole that he is 
treating, and selects the features of the object that render it impor- 
tant for the whole group ; the natural scientist selects the features 
that are common to all the members of a group. The historian 
combines his unique, complex individuals into ever larger and more 
complex wholes, rendering them definite by retaining as far as pos- 
sible their perceptible characteristics, and tracing the causal connec- 
tion ; the natural scientist forms his concepts into systems that are 
ever more comprehensive and consequently less complex or more 
abstract, and seeks for natural laws in which the cause is treated as 
equal to the effect. The natural scientist deals with the changing 
reality, but with changes that repeat themselves and thus render 
generalization possible ; the historian deals with a unique teleological 
series with definite parts, but bound together in the interest of 
causal connection by elements that are not teleologically essential. 

1 Rickert, Die Greiizeti der jiahtrivissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildting, 474. 



Historical SyntJiesis 1 9 

Were we permitted to deal solely with the absolute concepts in 
natural science and in historical science, the misunderstandmg 
between the two groups of scientists would be of but short dura- 
tion. Unfortunately for the peace of mind of truth-seeking men, 
there are also relative historical concepts ; and, more unfortunately 
still, a relative historical concept does not differ in form from the 
relative concept in natural science, or the concept that is valid only 
for a portion of the reality. To render the situation even more 
confusing, it is possible to have a historical concept that is more 
comprehensive than a scientific concept. This fact would seem to 
point to the unsoundness of the claim of the historian to the pos- 
session of a method logically different from that of the natural 
scientist. Every historical narrative contains concepts made up of 
elements that are common to a group of objects. The description 
of the condition of the French army on the eve of the Franco- 
Prussian war, of the German peasants in the time of Luther, of the 
French peasants under the old regime, deals with a group and 
forms a concept from what is common to a group and seemingly 
forms a general concept. This fact does not, however, change the 
logic of the historical method. The resemblance between the two 
methods is superficial. Just as the natural-science method, although 
dealing with a limited portion of the reality, into which the historical 
element enters, regards it from the point of view of the general 
and forms concepts valid for all the reality under investigation, so 
the historical method treats its large groups as unique, complex 
wholes and selects only such features of the groups as may be suf- 
ficient to characterize it. The aims are different ; one concept is 
relatively general, the other is relatively individual. To base a 
logic of historical method upon concepts with general contents 
would be impossible, as there is no means of knowing before in- 
vestigation whether the historically important in a certain portion of 
the reality can be exhausted by relative historical concepts. 

Rickert does not conclude his treatise with the discussion of the 
logic of the form of the historical concept. He devotes a chapter 
to the content of the concept, for the purpose of making clear why 
man is the center of all historical syntheses and why the x'alues 
with which the historian deals are culture or social values. He 
goes even further, and realizing that the question may be and has 
been raised as to whether history, even if it be a science, may make 
the same claims to objectivity as natural science, he turns in the 
last chapters of his book to the consideration of this problem and 
shows that the apriovi of natural science outnumber those of his- 
torical science. 



20 F. M. Flino- 



i> 



The compression of the arguments of a closely-reasoned work 
of seven hundred and forty pages into a score of pages is a thank- 
less task and can never serve as a substitute for the original work ; 
it can give little more than conclusions. The arguments justifying 
these conclusions must be sought in the work itself. • It is no new 
method that Rickert has given ; he has endeavored to show that the 
method that the historian has always employed and employs to-day 
is the logical one for him to use for the attainment of the end that 
he has in view ; he shows, furthermore, that that end is justifiable 
and history is even more empirically objective than natural science. 
As social facts are a part of the empirical reality, he shows that a 
natural-science point of view is possible for society and that it may 
even be possible to formulate the laws of social evolution — but these 
laws are not historical laws, the laws of a unique series. An his- 
torical law, a law of what has happened but once and cannot happen 
again, is a contradiciio in adjccto} 

The sociologists and the historians should endeavor to under- 
stand each other. At the conclusion of a review of Rickert's logic, 
based upon an article that gave, and intended to give, only a partial 
view of it, Lacombe seemed to realize that the difference between 
the methods of the sociologist and of the historian is due to a differ- 
ence in point of view, and exclaimed : " Truly, at the end, it seems 
to me that our debate reduces itself and ends in very small propor- 
tions and amounts simply to this : M. Rickert says, ' What you 
call sociology may be what you will, but not history ; I refuse to 
give it this name, this title.' — And I reply: 'Very well, so be it. 
We will reserve the name of history for the exposition of past 
events, such as has been practiced by that kind of studies in all 
times ; but we shall continue to study events in an entirely different 
manner from you ; we shall choose in the matter, in the historical 
reality, other aspects, other relations than those that alone have the 
privilege of interesting you ; and we shall form a science different 
from yours. This science will be called sociology or philosophical 
history, or scientific history, it matters little what, but it will be al- 
ways history, in this sense, that the historical fact, the human past, 
will always, indeed, be the object of our science as it is the object 
of yours. ' " 

When a sociologist writes like that, the discussion must be near 
its end. If historians and sociologists can agree that both deal with 
the past of society, but from different points of view ; that one looks 
at it from the point of view of a unique evolution, and the other 
from the point of view of general facts and laws ; that as their ends 

^ Ibid., 258. 



Historical SyntJiesis 2 1 

differ, their methods must differ ; that there would be no confusion 
if we retained the term history for the older point of view and em- 
ployed the term sociology for the later — if these fundamental 
points could be agreed upon, the debate would be over. Much 
that has been written in the course of the debate from Comte to 
Lamprecht is beside the mark. To argue that the natural-science 
method can be applied to the study of social facts is not to argue 
that the historical method is outgrown or that sociology can take 
the place of history. That would seem to be the fundamental de- 
fect in the position of Lamprecht. The historical method has not 
failed to keep abreast of the other sciences because it has not trans- 
formed itself into a natural science.^ Historical method has pro- 
gressed, not only in criticism, as Lamprecht acknowledges,^ but also 
in synthesis. How can any intelligent man who is not blinded by 
the belief that the natural-science method is the universal method 
compare the syntheses of European history produced in the past 
one hundred years with the syntheses upon the same subjects that 
were the products of preceding centuries, and say that the modern 
syntheses are not sounder and more scientific, that we are not 
working out a synthesis that will finally be accepted in its main 
outlines by scientific historians the world over? Even to-day his- 
torians are agreed upon the general outline of European history, 
and if they do disagree upon details, so do the natural scientists. 
Because these latter gentlemen cannot agree upon so fundamental 
a thing as whether acquired characteristics are transmitted, nobody 
thinks of substituting the historical method for the natural science 
method or of dubbing biology an art. 

Buckle was both harsh and hasty in his condemnation of his- 
torians. To characterize as intellectually inferior the men whose 
names lend dignity to the long list beginning with Herodotus and 
extending, in his day, to Ranke, is pardonable only on the ground 
of youth. That he could not see that men were beginning to ex- 
amine social phenomena from a new point of view, but that the new 
point of view did not render the old superfluous, is more intelligible. 
It is less intelligible after the discussion has lasted for a half-cen- 
tury, after sociology has taken shape and it is known that it is 
not history and cannot take the place of history. At a time when 
historical synthesis is steadily increasing in quantity and improving 
in quality, and when logic itself has at length justified the historical 
method, it would seem that the time had come to cease treating the 

J See the pertinent remarks of Xenopol on the natural growth of a method, in the 
Revue de Synthese Historiqite (October, I901), 1 74-176. 
2 Lamprecht, Die kulttirhistorische Methode, 16. 



2 2 F. M. Fling 

old method as an outgrown point of view, as a kind of alchemy 
or astrology. As long as men seek for knowledge of the unique 
evolution of their social past, just so long will the historical method 
be justifiable and the historical synthesis, the synthesis of Thucy- 
dides, of Polybius, of Tacitus, of Gibbon, and of Ranke, will be 
scientific, although it will never be the synthesis of the natural 
sciences, 

Fred Morrow Fling. 



